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1 Introduction
The central banks of most industrialized countries use interest rates to stabilize economic activity
and inflation. To do this well, they need to know how changes in the policy instrument affect
the economy. However, the fact of using these instruments to stabilize the economy makes it
difficult to disentangle their effects from their determinants. A number of authors have turned
to high-frequency financial market data to identify monetary policy innovations unrelated to the
state of the economy(see, for example, Kuttner, 2001, Gurkaynak et al., 2005a, 2007). In essence,
they exploit the fact that most of the changes in short-term interest rates futures occurring in
a window of a few minutes around policy announcements relate exclusively to monetary policy
news.1
This paper identifies monetary policy surprises in the United Kingdom (UK) and assesses
their effects on financial and macroeconomic variables with data from 1993 to 2015, during which
period UK monetary policy was operating under an inflation targeting regime. We contribute
to the literature on the effects of monetary policy in three main ways. First, we provide what
are to our knowledge the first published estimates of high-frequency monetary policy surprises
for the UK,2 and compare their effects on the macroeconomy with other studies. Second, we
employ local projection methods to show that these surprises have persistent effects on financial
markets, beyond the day on which they occur. Third, we combine our surprises with overlapping
narrative estimates of UK monetary policy innovations (constructed by Cloyne and Huertgen
(2014) following Romer and Romer (2004)’s approach) in a test of overidentifying restrictions
and find no evidence that either set of ‘shocks’ is endogenous to the macroeconomy.
We follow closely the methods employed in the literature, applying them as faithfully as
possible to the UK, but also implement a number of modifications and extensions.3 First, the
institutional framework for deciding and communicating monetary policy, with separate releases
of interest rate decisions and Inflation Report, enables us to enlarge the set of events under
consideration. Second, we perform estimations at daily frequency employing local projection
methods (Jorda, 2005), as well as at monthly frequency using structural Vector Autoregressions
(VARs), to demonstrate that these surprises have persistent effects on financial and macroeco-
nomic variables. Unlike VARs, local projection methods do not force our surprises to inherit
the average persistence of any disturbance to the interest rate. Third, we enlarge the set of such
variables under consideration, considering both daily asset prices and monthly macroeconomic
and financial data.
1This identification approach based on high frequency data is not new, and dates back to the work by Bagliano
and Favero (1999) and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002). See also Faust et al. (2004) Gurkaynak et al. (2005b), Faust
et al. (2007), and Bredin et al. (2009) for other examples.
2While writing this paper we became aware of a paper by Miranda-Agrippino (2015) that, using a similar
methodology, derives a series of monetary policy surprises for the UK.
3See, among others, Nakamura and Steinsson (2013), Barakchian and Crowe (2013), Rogers et al. (2014),
Gertler and Karadi (2015), Hanson and Stein (2015), Gilchrist et al. (2015), and Rogers et al. (2015).
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Our results show that the monetary surprises we construct have statistically and economically
significant effects on interest rates along the nominal spot and forward yield curves. Within
this, tightenings tend to raise forward real interest rates and to lower breakeven inflation rate.
Employing local projection methods to estimate the impulse responses at trading-day frequency,
we find that these effects persist for at least a month after the shock — thus complementing the
results of Rogers et al. (2014). Turning to the macroeconomic effects of our surprises, we find
that monetary policy tightenings raise unemployment and corporate lending spreads, strengthen
the exchange rate, and reduce trade volumes, stock prices and CPI. In sum, our paper advances
novel empirical evidence on the monetary transmission mechanism while also confirming some
standard results, on monetary non-neutrality and on the credit channel of monetary policy,
using a novel data set for the UK. In particular, our effects on financial and macroeconomic
variables are comparable to previous studies for the United States and for the UK (for example
Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) and Gertler and Karadi (2015); Mountford (2005) and Cloyne
and Huertgen (2014)).
The statistical inference that we conduct is reliable under two assumptions: (i) the absence
of ‘background noise’ in our measure of monetary policy surprises and (ii) their exogeneity to de-
velopments in the macroeconomy. Since the monetary policy surprises are measured with error,
the first assumption should be interpreted as saying that the noise-to-signal ratio is vanishingly
small. If this assumption is violated, our OLS parameter estimates will suffer from attenuation
bias. The second assumption rules out the possibility that other non-monetary news might affect
our monetary policy surprises during the window we consider around policy announcements. If
this assumption is violated, the monetary policy surprises can simply measure the central bank’s
response to its private information about the future evolution of the economy, therefore leading
to bias in the estimates.
We test assumption (i) by comparing our OLS estimates (which are only consistent under the
assumption that there is no noise in our measured monetary surprises) with the ‘identification
by heteroskedasticity’ estimator proposed by Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon (2003), Rigobon and
Sack (2004). We test assumption (ii) by exploiting a series that explicitly controls for the
information set of the central bank — the narrative measure of monetary policy innovations of
Cloyne and Huertgen (2014) — in a test of overidentifying restrictions. Our results show that
both assumptions are satisfied.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the framework for
setting and communicating monetary policy in the UK and describes how we construct the
monetary surprises. Section 3 provides evidence on the impact of monetary policy on ‘high
frequency’ financial variables using local projection methods, and on the absence of background
noise in our measure of monetary policy surprises. Section 4 shows their impact on macroeco-
nomic and financial variables in a structural VAR. Section 5 tests the validity of our instrument
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through overidentifying restrictions. Section 6 concludes.
2 A New Series of Monetary Policy Surprises for the United
Kingdom
In this section we derive a new series of monetary policy surprises for the UK, closely following
the methodology originally proposed by Kuttner (2001) and Gurkaynak et al. (2005a).
To preview our method, we construct a new dataset using intra-daily data that captures
changes in expectations about the monetary policy stance in the UK for every monetary policy
“event” since operational independence was granted to the Bank of England in 1997. We use
the term event to refer to a time at which a policy decision, or change in policy stance by the
Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England (MPC), was communicated to financial
markets. We proxy the changes in expectations about the monetary policy stance by computing
the change in interest rate futures (at different maturities) in a thirty-minute window around
every monetary policy event. The short time horizon over which these surprises are computed
allows us to isolate the monetary policy news from other types of news that can also shift the
yield curve.
In what follows we first review the monetary policy framework in the UK and how we compile
our set of monetary policy events for the UK. We then describe how we construct the monetary
surprises.
Monetary policy events. The UK adopted an inflation target as its nominal anchor in
September 1992, following its exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Union.
To begin with, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (the UK Finance Minister) retained control of
the policy instrument (the ‘Bank rate’) which was adjusted periodically in consultation with
the Governor of the Bank of England to meet the inflation target.4 In May 1997 the Bank of
England was given operational independence, i.e. the ability to set monetary policy so as to
achieve an inflation target decided by the Government.
Since then, the MPC has held monthly policy deliberations that led to policy announcements
and the release of minutes approximately two weeks later. The MPC’s view of the economic and
financial outlook is also communicated in quarterly Inflation Reports, released between the policy
decision and the minutes relating to the February, May, August and November MPC meetings.
This means that, over the period we study, we have 28 scheduled events of monetary news in each
year. However, in our baseline we drop the 12 events each year associated with the publication
of meeting minutes, as these often coincided with the release of important macroeconomic data
4Bank rate is the rate of interest that the Bank of England pays on reserve balances held by commercial banks.
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(specifically, with Labour Market Statistics).5 This leaves us with 291 monetary policy events:
218 MPC meetings and 73 releases of the Inflation Report.
Since June 1997, the MPC has set Bank rate to achieve its inflation target. A liquid contract
based on Bank rate would therefore be the most appropriate contract to compute the surprises.
However, and unlike the case of Fed Funds for the US, there is no futures market based on this
rate in the UK. Considering the length of the available set of contracts and their market size, the
Sterling futures contracts are the most appropriate ones for measuring the expected evolution
of interest rates. These contracts are settled based on the 3-month London Interbank Offered
Rate (Libor).6 In particular, in a given year, there are four delivery dates at the end of the
following months: March, June, September, and December.7,8
Monetary policy surprises. We measure our interest-rate surprises through intra-daily
changes in the price of 3-month sterling futures contracts. The price of these contracts is quoted
as 100 minus the Libor rate for three-month sterling deposits set on the last trading day of
the month in question. So, if investors are risk neutral, the price of a 3-month Sterling future
expiring on date h on a given day t is related to expected future interest rates as follows:
P ht = 100− Et
[
i
(h+90)
h
]
, (1)
where P ht denotes the current price for a contract that matures on day h and Et
[
i
(h+90)
h
]
denotes
the expected value (on day t) of the 3-month (i.e., h + 90 days) Libor at time h. We define
a monetary policy surprise as the change in the price of the 3-month Sterling future in a 30
minutes window around a monetary policy event:
st = −
(
P ht,τ+20 − P ht,τ−10
)
, (2)
where t, τ denotes the exact time (in minutes) during day t when a monetary policy event
occurred; and P h denotes the price of a contract that expires on date h. We use the minus in
front of the price change to express the surprise such that a positive number means an increase
in the expected interest rate implied by P h. Then, from equations (1) and (2), we can define
5Note, however, that we include these events in a robustness exercise and our results are virtually unchanged.
6A better, alternative contract would be the Sterling Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS), as suggested by Joyce
et al. (2008). This contract is based on the Sterling Overnight Index Average (SONIA), which carries a lower risk
premium than Libor. However, OIS contracts at intradaily frequency are available only from 2008 and —since
they are traded in OTC markets— the data on intraday transactions are not always available. Appendix A
describes in detail all the contracts available for the UK and their characteristics.
7For example, on January 1st four contracts are available. These contracts mature at the end March, June,
September, and December, respectively. Strictly speaking, there are two additional contracts that expire at the
end of January and at the end of February. However, these contracts are very illiquid, therefore in our analysis
we only consider the main four contracts mentioned above.
8One disadvantage of these contracts compared to the Fed Funds Futures is that the latter has a monthly
delivery date and is based on the 30 day average of Fed Funds rate. Appendix provides A more information about
these contracts.
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the surprise in terms of the expected rate:
st = E(t,τ+20)
[
i
(h+90)
h
]
− E(t,τ−10)
[
i
(h+90)
h
]
, (3)
where E(t,τ+20)
[
i
(h+90)
h
]
denotes the expected value of the 3-month Libor at time h, 20 minutes
after the monetary policy event that occurred on day t at time τ (i.e., t, τ + 20). We think of
these measured surprises, st, as noisy signals of the ‘true’ monetary news 
mp
1,t associated with
the policy event in question:
st = 
mp
1,t + ηt, (4)
where the term ηt (which is orthogonal to 
mp
1,t ) represents the noise component of the measure-
ment. We also allow this underlying news (the one that we measure with our surprises) to be,
in turn, a subset of the universe of monetary shocks mpt that occur within a given period. As
purely illustrative example consider:
mpt = 
mp
1,t + 
mp
2,t + 
mp
3,t , (5)
where — if mp1,t are the shocks associated with policy decisions and the Inflation Report —
{mp2 , mp3 } could be those shocks associated with speeches by members of the MPC, changes in
the membership of the MPC (and the associated change in attitudes towards inflation stabiliza-
tion), or changes in the mandate of the MPC itself.
Underlying assumptions. The monetary policy surprises st can be then used directly in
simple regressions to compute consistent estimates of the effect of monetary shocks on financial
markets and the economy only if:
(i) the background noise is uncorrelated with developments in the macroeconomy, namely
E[η | x] = 0 (where x is the state of the macroeconomy);
(ii) the background noise is negligible, i.e. E[η2] ' 0.
Further conditions may apply depending on what estimator is being used, and will be examined
in detail below. We next discuss how our high-frequency procedure is designed to ensure that
these two assumptions are satisfied, and why the procedure might fail.
Starting with assumption (i), the choice of a tight window around the monetary policy
event helps to isolate monetary policy news from other types of news. As noted above, we
drop those events that coincided with data releases such that no major macroeconomic data
releases occurred during our sample windows. One further possibility that would undermine
our procedure is that policy events contain significant information about the macroeconomic
determinants of monetary policy, as well as news about policy conditional on those determinants.
This may be the case if the central bank is perceived to have private information about the
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outlook for the economy, resulting from privileged access to data or a superior ability to process
it. For example, a surprise tightening of monetary policy could therefore be taken to indicate an
improvement in the outlook for the macroeconomy. In this case, our monetary surprises will be
correlated with non-monetary news about the economy; and the estimated impact of monetary
surprises on macroeconomic and financial variables will be biased.
In this regard, Independent Evaluation Office (2015) reviews the accuracy of the Bank of
England’s macroeconomic forecasts and finds mixed results. Inter alia, this study finds that the
Bank of England’s two-year-ahead forecast errors for GDP, inflation and unemployment were
correlated with data available when the forecast was made; and that, at the policy-relevant
two-year horizon, private sector forecasts outperformed the Bank of England’s. So there is
little direct evidence that the MPC’s forecasts contain significant incremental information about
the determinants of monetary policy. To provide further evidence of the exogeneity of our
measured monetary surprises, section 5 conducts a formal test of overidentifying restrictions
using another series of monetary innovations that explicitly controls for the Bank of England’s
private information set. According to the test we cannot reject the null hypothesis that both
sets are exogenous to the macroeconomy, against the alternative that at least one of them is
not.
We turn now to assumption (ii). The presence of background noise in our measure of mon-
etary surprises (i.e., E[η2] > 0 even though E[η | x] = 0, where x is the state of the macroecon-
omy) can lead to a bias in the parameter estimates depending on whether we are thinking of our
surprises as monetary innovations or merely instruments for them. Prima facie, the existence of
such noise is likely: our surprises are derived from Libor contracts, an interbank rate that can
contain significant premia. During the recent crisis, the spread between Libor and the overnight
rate SONIA (which carries a much lower risk premium) fluctuated significantly.
Again, the choice of a tight window around the monetary policy event helps in this respect.
But we address this concern by also considering an alternative future contract that carries a
smaller risk premium (namely, the 3-month forward on the Sterling-US Dollar exchange rate)
to which our results are robust. Moreover, in section 3 below, we provide a formal test that
the scale of the noise is negligible, justifying their use as direct measures of shocks. And lastly,
we provide IV estimates as the baseline when assessing their macroeconomic effects in section 4
and as a robustness check when looking at their effect on financial markets in section 3.
A new series of monetary policy surprises for the UK. Figure 1 displays the series
of daily surprises computed using the second front contract of the 3-month Sterling future, i.e.
the 3-to-6-month ahead expectation about the 3-month Libor.9 Our series captures some of the
9The data for the monetary policy surprises is available at the authors’ web sites. See
https://sites.google.com/site/ambropo/CTV MonPolTransmission WP CfM.xls.
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main relevant monetary policy events in the period.10
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Figure 1 Daily Monetary Policy Surprises. Note. Daily monetary policy surprises
computed using the second front contract of the 3-month Sterling future, i.e. the 3-to-6-month
ahead expectation about the 3-month Libor. The surprises are computed using a 30 minutes
window around the identified monetary policy events.
Figure 1 also shows that there is a clear change in the volatility of the monetary policy
surprises after March 2009, when Bank rate reached 0.5 percent (i.e., the effective zero lower
bound in the case of the UK). This raises the issue of whether short-term future contracts are
appropriate to capture monetary policy surprises during the zero lower bound period. For this
reason, for the purposes of robustness tests, we also compute monetary policy surprises using
the fourth continuous contract of the 3-month Sterling future (i.e., the 9-month to 12-month
ahead expectation of the 3-month Libor) and the 3-month forward exchange rate between the
British Pound and the US Dollar, a measure that turns out to be highly correlated with more
standard measures of monetary news based on the UK yield curve. The UK monetary events in
our sample do not overlap with US ones, so this measure can be potentially useful to capture not
only conventional monetary policy surprises but also ‘unconventional’ monetary policy surprises
(such as forward guidance and quantitative easing announcements) that became the norm after
the Bank rate reached its effective zero lower bound in March 2009.
3 The High Frequency Impact of Monetary Policy Surprises
In this section we provide the details of the methodology that we use to compute the high
frequency impact of monetary policy surprises and present the main results. Then, we show
10Table D.1 in the Appendix reports the largest surprises identified using this contract and shows that they
coincide with important monetary policy events.
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that a key assumption underlying our methodology — the effective absence of background noise
from our measure of monetary policy surprises — is satisfied and, accordingly, that the statistical
inference that we conduct is reliable.
3.1 Methodology and Results
The goal of this section is to estimate the effect of the monetary policy news contained in sched-
uled MPC announcements and inflation reports on a wide range of ‘high frequency’ variables,
i.e. financial variables that are available at daily frequency. To do that one could estimate the
following regression equation:
∆yt = α+ β∆it + t, (6)
where ∆yt denotes the daily variation in a variable of interest (e.g., stock prices, exchange rates,
nominal and real interest rates at different maturities) and ∆it denotes the daily variation in
an indicator of the stance of monetary policy, such as a short-term risk-free interest rate. The
problem with the estimation of (6) is that ∆yt and ∆it may be simultaneously responding to
news that is not related to monetary policy. As Gurkaynak et al. (2005a) show, these problems
are a source of concern not only in monthly or quarterly regressions, but even in daily regressions.
However, as discussed in the previous section, changes in expectations about future interest
rates using a tight enough window around monetary events should be dominated by the infor-
mation about monetary policy. On the assumption that the markets and the central bank have
the same information about the determinants of monetary policy, any news that arrives in this
short window about how policy is to be set must be about the actions of policy makers given
the state of the economy, rather than the state of the economy itself. For econometric purposes,
they can therefore be considered as ‘exogenous’ monetary surprises.11 It is therefore possible
to regress the variable of interest (i) directly on the monetary policy surprise, as it is typically
done in the HFI literature; or (ii) on a given policy indicator using the monetary surprises (st)
as instruments in a 2SLS regression.
It might also be the case that our measured policy surprises are essentially noise, or short-
lived disturbances to market interest rates with no persistent effects on monetary or other
macroeconomic aggregates. With this in mind, we extend the daily contemporaneous regressions
that are typically estimated in the HFI literature by using local projection methods (see Jorda,
2005). Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
∆yt+h = α+ βhst +
J∑
j=1
γj,h∆yt−j +
K∑
k=1
δk,hxt−k + t, (7)
11We test this exogeneity assumption formally in section 5, using an overidentification restriction and the
alternative series of monetary policy shocks from Cloyne and Huertgen (2014).
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where h = 0, ...,H, H is equal to 20 trading days, and x are control variables. The coefficient
βh represents the average impact of a monetary policy surprise on the variable of interest h
days after the shock hit. A purely contemporaneous regression would restrict h = 0. In our
baseline we control for lagged values of the dependent variable, ∆yt−j and for lagged value of
the policy variable, which in our application is the 1-year nominal gilt yield. We set J = 5 and
K = 4 as suggested by the Akaike information criterion (AIC). If our surprises are exogenous
then the inclusion of lags will not affect the probability limit of our estimator β̂h, but will affect
its standard error and the value it takes in finite samples.12
We estimate the impact of monetary policy surprises on (i) nominal spot and forward gilt
yields at different maturities; (ii) forward real gilt yields as measured with the index-linked
gilt curve, and (iii) forward breakeven inflation rate at different maturities as implied by the
difference between these nominal and real yields. In the list of variables of interest we include
stock prices, exchange rates, and financial market spreads. Where daily data are unavailable on
certain days for particular series, as it is sometimes the case for the short end of the index-linked
gilt curve, we drop those days from our sample for that series only.
In what follows, we describe the results we obtain for each of these sets of variables. Figures 2,
3, and 4 report the point estimates of equation (7), together with 90 and 95 percent confidence
intervals. In each case the independent variable is the monetary policy surprise (st), while
the change in the dependent variable (∆yt+h) is measured over a one-day window at different
horizons h. We cumulate IRFs calculated in differences to get cumulative changes in levels over
the horizon in question.
Our sample runs from 1997:6 to 2015:5, therefore including both the global financial crisis
and its aftermath, i.e. a period where short-term interest rates — the ‘typical’ monetary policy
indicator — reached the zero lower bound. We compute our monetary policy surprises using
the second front contract on the 3-month Libor.13 But our results are robust to (i) using other
future contracts at different maturities; and (ii) not including the period where monetary policy
was constrained by the zero lower bound.14
Nominal interest rates. Figure 2 reports the effects of the monetary policy surprise on
nominal gilt yields, both spot rates (upper panel) and forward rates (lower panel). The scale
of the monetary policy surprise is arbitrary, so we rescale all impulse response functions (IRFs)
12As a robustness check, we run a more conservative specification of equation (7), where we do not include
any lags of ∆yt and xt as a control variable; and a specification where we set J = 3 and K = 2 as suggested by
the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). The results (not reported here, but available from the authors upon
request) do not display any significant difference.
13We use this future contract because it is the one that displays the higher F-Statistic to explain the daily
changes in the 1-year gilt yield.
14We report a set of robustness checks in an Online Appendix available on the authors’ web sites. See
https://sites.google.com/site/ambropo/CTV MonPolTransmission OnlineAppendix.pdf.
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such that the effect of st on the 1-year nominal gilt yield is equal to 25 basis points (upper panel,
top left chart), with the standard errors and confidence intervals scaled accordingly.
(a) Nominal spot gilt yields
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(b) Nominal forward gilt yields
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Figure 2 Response of Nominal Interest Rates to the Monetary Policy
Surprises. Note. Each panel reports the cumulative results from a separate OLS
regression as in equation (7). The dependent variable in each regression is the one
day change in the variable stated in the panel title. The independent variable is
the monetary policy surprise (st), computed using the second front contract of the
3-month Sterling future. The sample period is 1997:6 to 2015:5. The solid line and
shaded areas report the mean, 90%, and 95% confidence intervals computed using
bootstrap with 1,000 replications.
The upper panel shows that the monetary policy surprise has a statistically significant im-
pact on gilt yields. Furthermore, this impact is persistent, statistically different from zero and
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slightly decreasing over the 20-trading-day horizon under consideration. As we move along the
yield curve to longer maturities, the impact of the monetary policy surprise on yields generally
becomes weaker and statistically less significant. So, the monetary policy surprises that we
measure have an appreciable and persistent impact along a broad swathe of the yield curve.
The bottom panel depicts the decomposition of the impact on the spot yield curve into its
effects on forward rates at different horizons. The charts in the lower panel of Figure 2 suggest
that the impact on nominal instantaneous forward rates at one-year and two-year horizons is
almost identical to that on the one-year spot rate. So the impact of monetary policy surprises
on the expected level of short-term interest rates is almost flat for at least two years, suggesting
that the markets view policy shocks as highly persistent. Consistent with our findings on the
spot curve, as we move further along the forward curve the impact on the instantaneous forward
rates falls towards and eventually beyond zero. The effect on 10-year and 20-year instantaneous
forward rates is negative but not statistically significant. In summary, our policy surprises have
large impact on expected short-term interest rates and then gradually decline at longer horizons.
Real interest rates and inflation. Figure 3 reports the effects of the monetary policy surprise
on real forward gilt yields and breakeven inflation rate (left and right panel, respectively), the
implied inflation over commensurate horizons obtained from index-linked gilt yields. Index-
linked government bonds are not consistently available at short maturities over our sample
period, limiting what we can reliably say about the effects of our surprises on the near end of
the real government liability curve. So our charts begin with 3-year maturities.
In order to interpret the IRFs correctly, it is necessary to provide some institutional context
for the measurement of breakeven inflation through index-linked government securities in the
UK. The consumer price index to which UK index-linked gilts are indexed is the General Index
of Retail Prices in the UK (RPI).15 This index includes an estimate of owner-occupier housing
costs, which depend, inter alia, on mortgage interest rates. The current inflation target of the
Bank of England is set in terms of the Consumer Prices Index (CPI), and prior to that in terms
of the RPIX, indices that exclude the cost of owner-occupied housing. The target was defined
in these terms precisely to avoid the direct effect of the mortgage rates on the target. Our
market-based measures of the impulse response of breakeven inflation and real interest rates as
would be measured with the CPI will tend to be biased, upwards and downwards respectively,
by this effect.
With this in mind, we now turn to describing the estimated effect of monetary policy surprises
on real interest rates and breakeven inflation. Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows that real interest rates
rise slightly on impact at the three-year maturity, while keeping the other real rates unchanged.
This implies that the central bank can have an effect on real interest rates at medium to long
15See http://www.dmo.gov.uk/index.aspx?page=gilts/indexlinked for further details.
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(a) Real forward gilt yields
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(b) Breakeven inflation rate
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Figure 3 Response of Real Interest Rates and Inflation to the Monetary Policy Surprises.
Note. Each panel reports the cumulative results from a separate OLS regression as in equation (7). The
dependent variable in each regression is the one day change in the variable stated in the panel title. The
independent variable is the monetary policy surprise (st), computed using the second front contract of
the 3-month Sterling future. The sample period is 1997:6 to 2015:5. The solid line and shaded areas
report the mean, 90%, and 95% confidence intervals computed using bootstrap with 1,000 replications.
horizons, a result that echoes the findings in Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) for the United
States. Furthermore, this effect is large enough to outweigh the bias imparted by the mechanical
effect on RPI explained above.
Panel (b) of Figure 3 shows the effect of the monetary surprises on the breakeven inflation
curve. The three, five and ten years rates decline significantly, to the tune of 0.1−0.3 percentage
points. Note here that breakeven inflation rates capture both inflation expectations and a risk
compensation term. If the risk compensation term responds to monetary policy tightening
(similarly to what corporate risk premia do, as we show below), then the impact of the monetary
policy surprises on inflation expectations could be larger than the OLS estimates reported above.
There is no significant impact at the 20-year forward horizon. Nevertheless, these estimates
suggest that monetary policy surprises are able to affect breakeven inflation several years into
the future.
FX, equities, and corporate spreads. Figure 4 reports the effects of the monetary policy
surprise on some selected exchange rates vis-a-vis Sterling, the FTSE index and a measure
of corporate (investment grade) credit spreads.16 We find that a surprise monetary policy
tightening causes the pound Sterling to appreciate vis-a-vis the US Dollar by about 0.5 percent
on impact, with the impact rising to a peak of more than 2 per cent. The effect on the exchange
rates of Sterling against the euro and the yen is similar, even though slightly smaller in magnitude
16Exchange rates are defined such that a rise means an appreciation
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and less statistically significant than in the case of the US Dollar. This is reflected in the response
of the Exchange Rate Index (ERI), which appreciates by slightly less than 1.5 percent.
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Figure 4 Response of Other Financial Market Variables to the Mone-
tary Policy Surprises. Note. Each panel reports the cumulative results from a
separate OLS regression as in equation (7). The dependent variable in each regres-
sion is the one day change in the variable stated in the panel title. The independent
variable is the monetary policy surprise (st), computed using the second front con-
tract of the 3-month Sterling future. The sample period is 1997:6 to 2015:5. The
solid line and shaded areas report the mean, 90% and 95% confidence intervals
computed using bootstrap with 1,000 replications.
The response of equity markets is muted on impact, but the FTSE tends to fall over the
horizon considered in our impulse responses getting to a low of about 2 percent one month after
the shock hit. Finally, a measure of corporate credit spread (for investment grade firms) tend
to increase in the face of a monetary policy tightening, with a maximum impact of about 20
basis points at the end of the horizon considered. The response of the credit spread corroborates
one important result put forth by Gertler and Karadi (2015) in their analysis. Specifically, our
results point to the presence of a “credit channel” of monetary policy (Bernanke and Gertler,
1995), according to which agency costs create a wedge between the costs of external finance and
internal funds.
In summary, our monetary surprises have statistically and economically significant effects on
interest rates several years along the yield curve. The response of real and nominal gilt yields
is stronger for shorter maturities and null for rates longer than five years. Using index-linked
gilts we also identify an effect on breakeven inflation (up to 10 years ahead). These findings are
comparable to the ones of Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) for the United States. We also find
that a monetary policy surprise induces a significant increase in the corporate spread, in line
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with the findings of Gertler and Karadi (2015); appreciates the nominal exchange rate vis-a-vis
the US Dollar; and generates a fall in equity prices.
Finally, the use of local projection methods at daily frequency allows us to provide some novel
evidence on the persistence of these effects over time. Note that, unlike VARs, local projection
methods do not force our surprises to inherit the average persistence of any disturbance to the
interest rate. In this sense, we see our results as complementary to those of Rogers et al. (2014)
for unconventional monetary policy.
3.2 Testing the Extent of Background Noise in the Measured Shocks
As noted above, these impulse responses are estimated with OLS. Implicit in the use of OLS
is the assumption that, even if our measure of monetary news st does not capture all of the
monetary news in a given month or quarter, the choice of a short window implies that it does
not contain any background noise. If this assumption is violated, our parameter estimates will
suffer from attenuation bias.
Concretely, we can write the measured surprise, st, as a function of some underlying monetary
news, mp1,t , and an orthogonal measurement error, ηt, namely:
st = 
mp
1,t + ηt (8)
Our OLS estimator will only be consistent to the extent that the noise-to-signal ratio is vanish-
ingly small:
plim
(
β̂hOLS
)
=
Cov (st,∆yt+h)
V ar (st)
=
Cov
(
mp1,t ,∆yt+h
)
V ar
(
mp1,t
)
+ V ar (ηt)
= (9)
=
Cov
(
mp1,t ,∆yt+h
)
V ar
(
mp1,t
) V ar
(
mp1,t
)
V ar
(
mp1,t
)
+ V ar (ηt)
,
where the left-hand term is the effect of pure monetary news on the response variable ∆yt and
the right hand term tends towards unity as the noise-to-signal ratio tends towards zero.
We can test this assumption by comparing our OLS estimates, which are only consistent
under the assumption that there is no noise in our measured monetary surprises, with the
‘identification by heteroskedasticity’ estimator (see Rigobon, 2003, Rigobon and Sack, 2004,
Nakamura and Steinsson, 2013). This involves collecting data for a control sample of observations
during which the variance of background noise is likely be the same, but the variance of monetary
news is different. To this end we compile a control group {∆yct , sct} of movements in the same
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asset prices during the window 1997:6–2015:5 on the last Wednesday of each month. The
heteroskedasticity-based estimator is given by:
β̂hRIG =
Cov (st,∆yt+h)− Cov
(
sct ,∆y
c
t+h
)
V ar (st)− V ar (sct)
. (10)
If the difference between this estimator and OLS is small, it follows that the background noise
in our measured monetary surprises is small. To conduct inference on this estimator, we follow
Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) and construct a test statistic g
(
βh
)
that is zero at the true
value of βh:
g
(
βh
)
= ∆Cov (∆yt, st)− βh∆V ar (st) , (11)
where ∆Cov and ∆V ar denote the difference in sample moments between the treatment and
control samples.17 For a given hypothetical value of βh we can compute the distribution of g
(
βh
)
with a standard bootstrap procedure. If the hypothesized value of βh falls within the confidence
interval defined by the {α/2, 1− α/2} percentiles of the distribution at which g (βH) = 0 we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the OLS estimator is consistent.
We compute the test using the one-year gilt yield as left-hand side variable. We calculate
g
(
βh
)
for 105 bootstrapped samples over a grid of values of βh ∈ [−1, 1]. Figure 5 plots the
median value of g
(
βh
)
as a function of βh (solid line), together with its 95 percent confidence
interval (shaded areas), i.e. where we fixed α = 5. The interval for which g
(
βH
)
= 0 is defined
by [0.44, 0.75], with a median estimate of 0.56. In our baseline results using OLS, we estimate
the sensitivity of the change in the one-year gilt yield to our monetary surprise and obtain a
coefficient of 0.54 with a standard error of 0.06. That is, our OLS estimate (represented by the
dark dot in Figure 5) falls well inside the confidence interval of [0.44, 0.75] and is close to the
median estimate of 0.56. We accordingly conclude that the background noise in our measure of
monetary news is small enough to be safely ignored, such that estimation and inference based
on OLS is reliable.
An alternative possibility when confronted with measurement error of this sort would be
to employ Instrumental Variable (IV) techniques, using the measured monetary surprises as an
instrument. We can therefore calculate our scaled impulse response as:
plim
(
β̂hIV
)
=
Cov (st,∆yt+h)
Cov (st,∆it)
, (12)
where it is the one-year gilt yield. This is not necessary when the measurement error in our
monetary policy surprises variable is negligible, and will reduce the precision of our estimates
relative to OLS. But it is warranted when estimating a macroeconomic SVAR system to which
17As explained in Nakamura and Steinsson (2013), this more sophisticated procedure for inference is necessary
when there is a significant probability that the difference in the variance of ∆yt between the treatment and control
sample is close to zero. See Fieller (1954) and Staiger et al. (1997).
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Figure 5 Confidence Interval For g
(
βh
)
. Note. The solid plots
the median value of g
(
βh
)
as a function of βh; the shaded area plots
the 95 percent confidence interval. The interval for which g
(
βH
)
= 0
is [0.44, 0.75], with a median estimate of βh of 0.56. The dark dot plots
the sensitivity of the change in the one-year Gilt yield to the monetary
surprise st obtained with OLS.
to we do not want to add our instrument. It is therefore the approach we take in the following
section.
4 The Transmission of Monetary Policy Surprises to the Real
Economy
In this section we investigate how of monetary policy surprises transmit to the real economy by
estimating a structural VAR for the UK. We first present the empirical model and the procedure
we use to identify the ‘exogenous’ monetary policy innovations. We then report the empirical
results.
4.1 The Econometric Framework
The objective of this section is to provide evidence on the transmission of exogenous monetary
policy innovations to the UK economy using a structural VAR. Therefore, as it is common in
the VAR literature, we need a way to isolate an innovation to the monetary policy indicator
that reflects shifts in the monetary policy stance that are not due to a response of central bank
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to other structural shocks. In order to identify such monetary policy ‘shock’ we use the external
instruments identification approach proposed by Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and
Ravn (2013), closely following the approach used by Gertler and Karadi (2015) for the case of
the United States.
This identification strategy (whose details are reported in Appendix B) uses standard instru-
mental variable techniques to isolate the variation of the VAR reduced-form residuals that are
due to the structural shock of interest. In this way it is possible to identify the contemporaneous
response of all endogenous variables in the VAR system to the shock of interest. To obtain the
impulse responses at longer horizons, one can then simply iterate the VAR forward.
The variables that we include in our baseline specification are the 1-year gilt yield, our policy
indicator; a consumer price index as a measure of prices; the unemployment rate, as a measure
of economic activity; the nominal effective exchange rate; stock prices as measure by the FTSE
index; a measure of (investment grade) corporate spreads; and imports and exports.18 We
include imports, exports, and the exchange rate in our baseline specification because in a small
open economy like the UK, movements in the exchange rate and in the trade balance are crucial
determinants of monetary policy transmission. Similarly, we control for global shocks that are
potentially important to explain the dynamics of domestic variables. Specifically, we include
a global commodity price index and the VIX index in an exogenous block of the VAR. While
the inclusion of the exogenous block helps the identification of UK-specific monetary policy
surprises and increases the precision of our estimates, all our results are robust to dropping
these variables.19
The monetary policy surprises that we constructed in section 2 are arguably a measure
of monetary policy news that is not correlated with other fundamental disturbances. We can
therefore use them to isolate the variation in policy instrument’s reduced form residuals that is
due exclusively to the monetary policy shock. Since different policy surprises (i.e., computed
with different underlying contracts) are available, we choose the one that has the largest F-
Statistic in instrumenting the reduced form residuals of the 1-year gilt equation in the VAR. In
our case, this is the 2nd front contract of 3-month Sterling future.
Following Sims et al. (1990), we estimate the VAR systems in levels without explicitly mod-
eling the possible cointegration relations among them.20 We use the BIC information criterion
to choose the optimal number of lags, which we set to two. We check that the residuals are not
18All variables were Seasonally Adjusted using X13-ARIMA-SEATS program. The consumer price index,
nominal effective exchange rate, stock prices, imports and exports enter the VAR in log-levels. Appendix A
describes the data sources for all variables.
19These robustness exercises, together with the extensive list of other robustness checks mentioned below, are
reported in the Online Appendix.
20Sims et al. (1990) show that if cointegration among the variables exists, the system’s dynamics can be
consistently estimated in a VAR in levels.
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serially correlated with this specification. Note, however, that the results are robust to different
lag specifications.
We estimate the VAR using monthly data for the UK for the period 1993:1–2015:5.21 We
choose the starting point to coincide with the beginning of the inflation targeting regime in the
UK. Prior to this, the UK was (i) essentially shadowing the Deutsche Mark and (ii) the target
and operating framework for monetary policy were very different. Thus, a sample starting before
1993:1 will likely affected by a structural break. Given the ending point, the data includes the
recent crisis and its aftermath, where Bank rate — the ‘typical’ monetary policy indicator —
did not move from the level of 50 basis points reached in 2009. To address this issue, we choose
as policy indicator a safe interest rate at longer maturity (i.e., the nominal yield on the 1-year
gilt). But we also check the robustness of our results by (i) using longer maturity gilts as a
policy indicator; (ii) using the 3-month forward exchange rate between the British Pound and
the US Dollar as an instrument; and (iii) excluding the period over which Bank rate did not
show any time variation.22
Note that our monetary policy surprises are available only for a subsample of the period
over which the VAR is estimated, namely from 1997:6 to 2015:5. We choose a longer sample
period for the estimation of the VAR so as to estimate with greater precision the lag coefficients
and the reduced form residuals. Finally note also that we need to aggregate the daily monetary
policy surprises into a monthly series. We do that following the procedure employed by Gertler
and Karadi (2015) and we check that results do not change when simply summing the surprises
within the month. The time series properties of the monthly surprises are reported in Appendix
B, together with their correlation with the monetary policy surprises computed with different
contracts.
4.2 Estimation Results
In this section we report two sets of results. Before turning to our full specification, we report
the impulse responses from a smaller scale VAR that allows a direct comparison with Gertler
and Karadi (2015)’s baseline results.
Comparison with Gertler and Karadi. To allow a comparison with Gertler and Karadi
(2015), we estimate a VAR with four variables only: the yield on the 1-year gilt, the CPI,
unemployment, and the corporate spread. Figure 6 displays the impulse response function
(IRF) to an instrumented increase in the 1-year gilt rate, using as an instrument the 2nd front
contract of 3-month Sterling future. Note that the instrument is quite powerful in explaining
the behavior of the reduced form residuals of the policy indicator equation. The F-statistic from
21For the variables for which data is available at higher frequency, we compute monthly averages.
22Again, all these robustness exercises are reported in the Online Appendix.
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the first stage is 19.66, well above the relevant threshold of 10 suggested by Stock and Yogo
(2002). The R2 of the first stage regression is 0.08.
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Figure 6 IRFs To A Monetary Policy Shock - Comparison With
Gertler And Karadi (2015). Note. VAR estimated in log levels, with
2 lags, and a constant over the 1993:1-2015:5 period. The VAR includes as
exogenous variables a Commodity Price Index and the VIX index. The 1-year
Government Gilt Yield is instrumented using the second front contract of 3-
month Sterling future. First stage results: F-Statistic: 19.66 and R2 = 0.08.
The solid line and shaded areas report the mean and the 90% confidence inter-
vals computed using wild bootstrap with 1,000 replications.
We normalize the shock so that the 1-year gilt rate increases by 25 basis points. The shock
has a persistent effect on the 1-year gilt yield, lasting for about ten months after the shock hit.
Consumer prices fall slightly on impact, but the response is not statistically significant. The
impact, however, builds up over time and becomes borderline statistically significant (at the
90 percent confidence level) ten months after the shock hit, at a level of about −0.1%. This
magnitude is consistent with the evidence reported by Gertler and Karadi (2015) and with the
common view that the transmission of monetary policy is slow and gradual. This response also
shows that the identification through our external instrument does not suffer from a typical
problem that affects VARs identified with short-run restrictions, namely the “Price Puzzle”.23
The shock induces a small, and statistically significant increase in unemployment, consistent
with the contractionary impact of monetary policy shocks. Over the horizon considered in the
IRFs, the increase in unemployment reaches a maximum of 0.05%.24
23In a similar vein to Gertler and Karadi (2015), we show in the Online Appendix that, when the mone-
tary policy shock is identified with short-run restriction (i.e., where policy indicator is not allowed to respond
contemporaneously to unemployment and CPI), CPI tends to increase after a monetary policy tightening.
24We obtain virtually identical results in an even smaller scale VAR where we drop corporate credit spreads
from the list of endogenous variables. Results are reported in the Online Appendix.
20
Finally, the response of corporate spreads confirms one important result put forth by Gertler
and Karadi (2015). Our results show that a monetary policy shock that increases the yield
on the 1-year gilt by 25 basis point leads to an increase of corporate spreads by about 12.5
basis points, therefore supporting the view monetary policy operates through a credit channel
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).25
Full specification. We turn now to the full specification where, in addition to the variables
included in the previous VAR, we add the nominal effective exchange rate, imports and exports,
and the FTSE index. While the result from the first stage regression worsen a little (the F-
Statistic is now 13 and the R2 is 0.06), the inclusion of these variables allows us to consider an
important dimension for the transmission of monetary policy shocks in a small open economy
like the UK.
Figure 7 reports the IRFs to a monetary policy surprise that increase our policy indicator
(the nominal yield on the 1-year gilt) by 25 basis points in this larger VAR. The contractionary
monetary policy shock generates a persistent and significant reduction (0.13%) in the CPI that
reaches its minimum ten months after the shock. The magnitude of the response is similar to
the response in the smaller scale VAR reported in Figure 6.
In line with the daily regressions reported in section 3, the Pound appreciates by about 1%
in nominal effective terms and the Investment Grade Corporate Spread increases by about 15
basis points, again confirming the finding of Gertler and Karadi (2015) that the credit channel
is a relevant transmission mechanism of monetary policy. The FTSE index declines on impact
by 2% in response to the monetary policy tightening.
In principle, the real trade balance can improve or deteriorate in response to a tightening of
monetary policy. The exchange rate appreciation tends to switch expenditure towards foreign
goods, pushing down on exports and up on imports. On the other hand, the compression in
domestic expenditure that a monetary contraction creates will tend to push imports down. In
our baseline estimates, we find that a monetary policy shock leads to a 1% decline in exports,
which becomes significant four months after the shock. Import volumes fall by a similar amount.
Thus, monetary policy does not seem to affect significantly the trade balance in the UK.
The results in Figure 7 are slightly different from the ones of Cloyne and Huertgen (2014),
who use data for the UK over the 1975–2007 period. In particular, they find that inflation reacts
significantly only 24 months after the shock while in our case the reaction starts at 5 months.
This difference is most likely explained by the different sample we use in our analysis, namely
the period of Central Bank independence from 1993 to 2015. In a model with time-varying
25We estimate the same 4-variable VAR (and the larger-scale VAR below) excluding the extraordinary MPC
meetings and the dates of release of the Inflation Report from the set of events. Results are robust and reported
in the Online Appendix.
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Figure 7 IRFs To A Monetary Policy Shock - Full Specification.
Note. VAR estimated in log levels, with 2 lags, and a constant over the 1993:1-
2015:5 period. The VAR includes as exogenous variables a Commodity Price
Index and the VIX index. The 1-year Government Gilt Yield is instrumented
using the second front contract of 3-month Sterling future. First stage results:
F-Statistic: 13 and R2 = 0.06. The solid line and shaded areas report the
mean and the 90% confidence intervals computed using wild bootstrap with
1,000 replications.
coefficients, Ellis et al. (2014) show that monetary policy in the UK has become significantly
more effective to affect CPI after 1992, which they claim occurred via the impact of expectations
on prices. This accords well with the additional results reported in Cloyne and Huertgen (2014)
who show that in the post-1992 period inflation responds slightly faster than in their baseline.
Finally, our findings are comparable to Mountford (2005), who identifies the effects of monetary
shocks in the UK using sign restrictions, both in terms of magnitudes and timing.
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Summing up, the monetary policy surprise has a significant and persistent effect on the
macroeconomic variables and affects the economy both through the increase in the Corporate
Spread and the appreciation of the pound Sterling. In terms of the effect on activity and inflation,
Table 1 contains a detailed comparison with previous findings. Our estimates are broadly within
the pack, and if anything somewhat on the small side. However, the difference in the precise
measures and orders of integration of activity and inflation employed in the different studies
makes an exact comparison difficult. In particular, unemployment is likely to be smoother than
industrial production because of labour hoarding in response to temporary shocks, and the large
weight of the service and public sectors in total employment, sectors which may respond less
than industry to a monetary policy innovation.
Table 1 Summary of Previous Studies on Macroeconomic Effects of Monetary Policy
for the US and the UK
Authors Country Method Peak Effects (in %)
Output Prices/Inflation
Bernanke and Mihov, 1998 US VAR -0.6 to -1 (GDP) -0.7 to -1.6 (GDP Defl)
Christiano et al., 1999 US VAR -0.7 (GDP) -0.6 (GDP Defl)
Romer and Romer, 2004 US Narrative -1.9 to -4.3 (IP) -3.6 to -5.9(CPI/PPI)
Uhlig, 2005 US Sign Rest. -0.3 (GDP) -1.0 (GDP Defl)
Bernanke et al., 2005 US FAVAR -0.6 (IP) -0.7 (CPI)
Coibion, 2012 US Narrative -1.6 to -4.3 (IP) -1.8 to -4.2 (CPI Infl)
Barakchian and Crowe, 2013 US Fed Futures -0.9 (IP) -0.1 (CPI)
Gertler and Karadi, 2015 US Proxy SVAR -1.0 to -2.0 (IP) -0.75 to 0.3 (CPI)
Dedola and Lippi, 2005 UK VAR -0.5 (IP) 0.2 (CPI)
Mountford, 2005 UK Sign Rest. -0.6 (GDP) -0.15 (GDP Defl)
Ellis et al., 2014 UK FAVAR -2.0(IP, 92-05) -2 (CPI, 92-05)
Cloyne and Huertgen, 2014 UK Narrative -0.5 (IP) -1.0 (CPI Infl)
Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2016 UK Proxy SVAR 0.2 (Unempl) -0.5 (CPI)
Note. This table is an update of Table reported in Cloyne and Huertgen (2014). The peak effects correspond to
a one percentage point increase in the interest rate. In brackets we include the specific measure of Output and
Prices considered in each study. CPI Infl denotes CPI inflation.
5 Tests of Instrument Validity
A key condition for our estimates in the previous sections to be consistent is that our instrument,
st, is uncorrelated with non-monetary innovations in the system. As argued above, by selecting
a short window around policy events and dropping observations containing data releases, we are
able to make this so. But it is still possible that the policy decision contains news about the
determinants of monetary policy. For example, if the Bank of England has superior information
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about the state of the economy, changes in monetary policy which comes as a surprise to markets
may be systematically correlated with non-monetary developments in the macroeconomy.
In this section we exploit the availability of a complementary (and notionally exogenous)
measure of UK monetary policy innovations to check the validity of our instrument with a test
of overidentifying restrictions. This alternative measure is the one constructed by Cloyne and
Huertgen (2014), following the methodology proposed by Romer and Romer (2004), for the
period 1975:1–2007:12. We report it, together with our measure of monetary policy surprises,
in Figure 8. The two series overlap on the sample period 1997:6–2007:12. Over this period, the
two series are nearly orthogonal, with a contemporaneous correlation of −0.006.26
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Figure 8 Instruments For Monetary Policy Shock: Narrative And High Fre-
quency Measures. Note. The blue line displays Cloyne and Huertgen (2014)’s instrument
for monetary policy shocks (left axis). The red line displays the high-frequency instrument
developed in this paper (right axis).
To construct the test of overidentifying restrictions we proceed as follows. Consider the
structural representation of a VAR (with no constant and only one lag for simplicity of exposi-
tion):
Xt = F1Xt−1 +Bt, (13)
where Xt is a n× 1 vector of endogenous variables; t is a n× 1 vector of orthogonal structural
shocks, with Σ = In; F1 and B are n × n matrices of coefficients. The reduced form residuals
of the above VAR are given by ut = Bt.
Denote by z1 the series of monetary surprises constructed in this paper (i.e., the surprises
st) and by z2 an alternative series of instruments for exogenous monetary shocks, such as those
26The contemporaneous correlation between US narrative monetary policy shocks and US monetary policy
surprises is also low. We compute it using the data in Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016) (an update of the original
Romer and Romer (2004) series up to 2007:12 period) and the original data made available by Gertler and
Karadi (2015). The contemporaneous correlation varies between 0.14 and 0.27 depending on the monetary policy
surprised used.
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in Cloyne and Huertgen (2014). We assume that they are related to the true, full series of
monetary shocks mp as follows:
mp = α1z1 + ξ1,
mp = α2z2 + ξ2,
(14)
where the ξi are orthogonal to zi for i = 1, 2. The idea implicit in this representation is that
each instrument captures only a subset of the universe of monetary shocks mpt that occur within
a given period, while the remaining part is captured by the term ξi.
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To show how the procedure works, we first re-write the reduced form residuals of the policy
rate, CPI, and unemployment equations (ur, ucpi, and uu) into two orthogonal components: one
due to the monetary policy shock mp and a second one which is a linear combination of the
other structural shocks.28 Specifically, by letting bij be the i
th and jth element of the B matrix
in (13), we have:
ur = b11
mp + ζr,
uu = b21
mp + ζu,
ucpi = b31
mp + ζcpi,
where
ζr ≡ Σni=2b1ii,
ζu ≡ Σni=2b2ii,
ζcpi ≡ Σni=2b3ii,
(15)
where i for i = 2, ..., n are the remaining n − 1 structural shocks. Now, we can relate the
instruments and reduced form residuals to the unobserved components by combining equations
(14)-(15): 
z1
z2
ur
uu
ucpi
 =

1/α1 −1/α1 0 0 0 0
1/α2 0 −1/α2 0 0 0
b11 0 0 1 0 0
b21 0 0 0 1 0
b31 0 0 0 0 1


mp
ξ1
ξ2
ζr
ζu
ζcpi

. (16)
The covariance matrix of the vector of unobservables (whose derivation is reported in Appendix
C) gives a vector of 14 parameters to estimate:
θ = {α1, α2, b11, b21, b31, σ2ξ1 , σ2ξ2 , σ2ξ1ξ2 , σ2ζr , σ2ζu , σ2ζcpi , σ2ζrζu , σ2ζrζcpi , σ2ζuζcpi},
and we observe 15 moments in the covariance matrix of our five observables
{
z1, z2, u
r, uu, ucpi
}
.
We estimate the parameters of this system with iterative GMM.29 Were we to use only our
27Note that, consistently with our results in Section 3, this representation assumes that our instruments have
no background noise (η). As we shall see below, this representation is also supported empirically, as we find that
both z1 and z2 are statistically significant in explaining the policy indicator reduced form residual.
28Note that, in principle, one could consider up to n reduced form residuals but —as we shall see below— this
is not needed to achieve overidentification in our specific application.
29We check that the parameters are locally identified at the optimum with the gradient matrix of the moment
vector (checking that it is non-singular). We randomize over starting values for the optimization procedure to
ensure we have attained a global optimum. Additional details on the GMM procedure we use, together with the
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instrument, then our estimates of b11, b21, and b31 will be the same as in section 4. The addition
of an extra observable will change this to some extent. Our system is overidentified, so the
moment conditions are unlikely to hold exactly. But if our restriction holds approximately in
the data then the minimized value of our moment conditions will be close to zero. We can
accordingly test the null hypothesis that our exclusion restrictions hold with the Hansen-Sargan
statistic. The p-value of the resulting test is 0.39, indicating that we do not reject the null of our
exclusion restrictions. We accordingly find no evidence that our instruments or those contained
in Cloyne and Huertgen (2014) are endogenous.
A complementary and less formal test of the same condition is to estimate the SVAR system
using both instruments and see if we get substantially different results. If not, the addition of an
extra instrument may help to sharpen these results. Using the overlapping sample period 1997:6–
2007:12, we run a simple regression of the reduced form residuals on the two sets of monetary
policy surprises, and we find that both series are statistically significant. This suggests that the
two series pick up different sources of exogenous monetary innovation.
To make best use of the available data, we need a means of incorporating the non-overlapping
sample period. We try two alternative methods of aggregating the two non-overlapping samples.
First, we take a simple average of the instruments, having first normalized them to have equal
variance, combining them in a unique series that spans the whole second-stage sample period
1993:1–2015:5. The resulting series can therefore be used as an instrument for the reduced form
residuals (as in our baseline specification).30 We do this in light of the fact that both instruments
(i) are orthogonal, (ii) explain a significant fraction of the reduced form residual, and (iii) are
available over different sample periods that in part do not overlap.
Alternatively, by conduct three separate first-stage regressions — corresponding to one sub-
sample in which both instruments are available and two in which only one is — to obtain fitted
values of the interest rate. This method has the advantage of not restricting the coefficients on
the two (normalized) instruments to be the same, but the disadvantage of running regressions
with smaller samples and therefore weaker identification.
Figure 9 displays the IRFs obtained using these new series as an instrument. The F-Statistic
of the first stage regression increases (relative to our baseline specification) to 18.1 and the
R2 is 0.07 when using the average of the two instruments (higher than using each instrument
separately).31 The results show that both procedure give very similar results to our baseline.
full system of moment conditions, are reported in Appendix C.
30As an alternative (and virtually equivalent) way of combining the two series, we regress the reduced form
residuals on each instrument separately and then take an average of their fitted values. The results obtained with
these alternative series are robust.
31Consistently, the boostrapped responses of macroeconomic and financial variables are similar to our baseline
specification, with slightly smaller error bands. See Figure D.1 Appendix D.
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Taken together, these results suggest that our instrument is valid and, relatedly, that our results
are robust to and somewhat sharpened by combining it with the other available instrument.
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Figure 9 IRFs To A Monetary Policy Shock - Full Specification
With Two Instruments - Comparison of Instrument Aggregation
Methods. Note. VAR estimated in log levels, with 2 lags, and a constant
over the 1993:1-2015:5 period. The VAR includes as exogenous variables a
Commodity Price Index and the VIX index. The 1-year Government Gilt
Yield is instrumented using the second front contract of 3-month Sterling future
(blue line). It is combined with Cloyne and Huertgen (2014)’s monetary policy
shocks series as a normalized sum (green dashed line) and with 3 subsample
regressions (red dotted line).
One final concern is that one (or both) set of instruments is not valid but this is not picked
up by the test because it has low power — in which case the test will often not reject a false
null hypothesis of invalid instruments. With this in mind, we run our GMM test using the
US analogues of our surprises (i.e. Gertler and Karadi, 2015) and those in Cloyne and Huertgen
(2014) (i.e. Romer and Romer, 2004). Researchers have separately used alternative tests to claim
that both sets of US shocks are forecastable from lagged information, and therefore endogenous
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to the macroeconomy.32 We run our GMM-based test above with these two US series and can
reject the null that they are both valid instruments at a 5% significance level.33 This suggests
that our test has some power to detect violations of the validity conditions, and accordingly
gives some confidence that our non-rejection of the UK instruments is not a false negative.
6 Conclusions
What is the impact of ‘exogenous’ monetary policy surprises on financial markets and on the
macroeconomy? This paper tries to answer this crucial question, using a novel data set for the
UK.
To identify exogenous variation in monetary policy, we construct a series of UK monetary
policy surprises using the high-frequency methods pioneered by Kuttner (2001) and Gurkaynak
et al. (2005a). In line with previous studies, we find evidence of their effect on UK real interest
rates and inflation. Applying local projection methods, we are also able to provide some novel
evidence on the persistence of these effects in financial markets. We then employ our series of
monetary policy surprises as instruments in an structural VAR. A monetary policy tightening
generates a persistent and statistically significant reduction in the CPI that reaches its minimum
ten months after the shock, appreciates the Pound, and increases corporate spreads. These
findings confirm that both the credit and external channels are relevant for the transmission of
monetary policy in an open economy like the UK.
The monetary policy surprises that we construct are designed to be exogenous to non-
monetary developments in the macroeconomy. But there is still the possibility that policy
events contain significant information about the macroeconomic determinants of monetary pol-
icy, therefore undermining our procedure. To provide further evidence of the exogeneity of our
measured monetary surprises, we exploit the alternative measure of monetary policy innovations
constructed by Cloyne and Huertgen (2014) using narrative methods. We propose a new test of
overidentifying restrictions and find no evidence that our monetary policy surprises contain any
response to macroeconomic variables. This suggests that both series contain complementary
information about monetary policy.
Overall, our findings suggest that monetary policy has significant and persistent effects on
both financial and macroeconomic variables. This evidence is relevant to improve our under-
32See, for example, Gertler and Karadi (2015), Ramey (2016), Campbell et al. (2016), Vicondoa (2016),
Miranda-Agrippino (2016).
33We first replicated Gertler and Karadi (2015) baseline VAR (i.e., Figure 1 in their paper) using the data avail-
able at https://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mac/data/0701/2013-0329 data.zip. We then estimated the same system as
in (16) using the residuals of policy rate, industrial production and CPI and the two alternative instruments.
The p-value of the Hansen-Sargan test is 0.05, indicating that we do reject the null hypothesis that our exclusion
restrictions hold.
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standing of the different transmission channels of monetary policy, which has been keenly de-
bated. A key advantage of our series of surprises is that it includes market reaction both to
current unexpected changes in policies and to future path of monetary policy related to mone-
tary policy events. Considering that central banks have been relying more on forward guidance,
we hope that this new series of surprises, together results presented in this paper, will be useful
for the current debate and future research on this area.
29
References
Bagliano, F. C. and C. A. Favero (1999): “Information from financial markets and VAR measures
of monetary policy,” European Economic Review, 43, 825–837.
Barakchian, S. M. and C. Crowe (2013): “Monetary Policy Matters: Evidence from New Shocks
Data,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 60, 950–966.
Bernanke, B., J. Boivin, and P. Eliasz (2005): “Measuring the Effects of Monetary Policy: A
Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) Approach,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120,
387–422.
Bernanke, B. and I. Mihov (1998): “Measuring Monetary Policy,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
113, 869–902.
Bernanke, B. S. and M. Gertler (1995): “Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary
Policy Transmission,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 27–48.
Bredin, D., S. Hyde, D. Nitzsche, and O. Gerard (2009): “European Monetary Policy Surprises:
the Aggregate and Sectoral Stock Market Response,” International Journal of Finance and Economics,
14, 156–171.
Campbell, Jeffrey R.and Fisher, J. D. M., A. Justiniano, and L. Melosi (2016): “Forward
Guidance and Macroeconomic Outcomes Since the Financial Crisis,” in NBER Macroeconomics Annual
2016, Volume 31, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, NBER Chapters.
Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum, and C. L. Evans (1999): “Monetary policy shocks: What have
we learned and to what end?” in Handbook of Macroeconomics, ed. by J. B. Taylor and M. Woodford,
Elsevier, vol. 1 of Handbook of Macroeconomics, chap. 2, 65–148.
Cloyne, J. and P. Huertgen (2014): “The macroeconomic effects of monetary policy: a new measure
for the United Kingdom,” Bank of England working papers 493, Bank of England.
Cochrane, J. and M. Piazzesi (2002): “The Fed and Interest Rates - A High-Frequency Identifica-
tion,” American Economic Review, 92, 90–95.
Coibion, O. (2012): “Are the Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks Big or Small?” American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics, 4, 1–32.
Dedola, L. and F. Lippi (2005): “The Monetary Transmission Mechanism: Evidence from the Indus-
tries of Five OECD Countries,” European Economic Review, 49, 1543–1569.
Ellis, C., H. Mumtaz, and P. Zabczyk (2014): “What Lies Beneath? A Time-Varying FAVAR
Model for the UK Transmission Mechanism,” The Economic Journal, 124, 668–699.
Faust, J., J. Rogers, S.-Y. B. Wang, and J. Wright (2007): “The High-Frequency Response of Ex-
change Rates and Interest Rates to Macroeconomic Announcements,” Journal of Monetary Economics,
54, 1051–1068.
Faust, J., E. Swanson, and J. Wright (2004): “Identifying VARS Based on High Frequency Futures
Data,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 51, 1107–1131.
Fieller, E. (1954): “Some Problems in Interval Estimation,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society
Series B (Methodological), 16(2), 175–185.
Gertler, M. and P. Karadi (2015): “Monetary Policy Surprises, Credit Costs, and Economic Activ-
ity,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7, 44–76.
30
Gilchrist, S., D. Lopez-Salido, and E. Zakrajsek (2015): “Monetary Policy and Real Borrowing
Costs at the Zero Lower Bound,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7, 77–109.
Gurkaynak, R., B. Sack, and E. Swanson (2005a): “Do Actions Speak Louder than Words? The
Response of Asset Prices to Monetary Policy Actions and Statements,” International Journal of Central
Banking, 1, 55–93.
——— (2005b): “The Sensitivity of Long-Term Interest Rates to Economic News: Evidence and Impli-
cations for Macroeconomic Models,” American Economic Review, 95, 425–436.
——— (2007): “Market-Based Measures of Monetary Policy Expectations,” Journal of Business and
Economic Statistics, 25, 201–12.
Hanson, S. and J. Stein (2015): “Monetary Policy and Long-Term Real Rates,” Journal of Financial
Economics, 115, 429–448.
Independent Evaluation Office (2015): “Evaluating forecast performance,” Working paper series,
Bank of England.
Jorda, O. (2005): “Estimation and Inference of Impulse Responses by Local Projections,” American
Economic Review, 95, 161–182.
Joyce, M., J. Relleen, and S. Sorensen (2008): “Measuring monetary policy expectations from
financial market instruments,” Working Paper Series 0978, European Central Bank.
Kuttner, K. (2001): “Monetary Policy Surprises and Interest Rates: Evidence from the Fed Funds
Futures Market,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 47, 523–544.
Mertens, K. and M. O. Ravn (2013): “The Dynamic Effects of Personal and Corporate Income Tax
Changes in the United States,” American Economic Review, 103, 1212–47.
Miranda-Agrippino, S. (2015): “Unsurprising shocks,” Unpublished manuscript.
——— (2016): “Unsurprising Shocks: Information, Premia, and the Monetary Transmission,” Working
Paper 2016-13, Centre for Macroeconomics.
Mountford, A. (2005): “Leaning into the Wind: A Structural VAR Investigation of U.K. Monetary
Policy,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 67, 597–621.
Nakamura, E. and J. Steinsson (2013): “High Frequency Identification of Monetary Non-Neutrality,”
NBER Working Papers 19260, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Ramey, V. A. (2016): “Macroeconomic Shocks and Their Propagation,” NBER Working Papers 21978,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Rigobon, R. (2003): “Identification through Heteroskedasticity,” The Review of Economics and Statis-
tics, 85, 777–792.
Rigobon, R. and B. Sack (2004): “The Impact of Monetary Policy on Asset Prices,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 51, 1553–1575.
Rogers, J., C. Scotti, and J. Wright (2015): “Unconventional Monetary Policy and International
Risk Premium,” Mimeo, IMF.
Rogers, J. H., C. Scotti, and J. H. Wright (2014): “Evaluating Asset-Market Effects of Uncon-
ventional Monetary Policy: A Cross-Country Comparison,” International Finance Discussion Papers
1101, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
31
Romer, C. D. and D. H. Romer (2004): “A New Measure of Monetary Shocks: Derivation and
Implications,” American Economic Review, 94, 1055–1084.
Sims, C. A., J. H. Stock, and M. W. Watson (1990): “Inference in Linear Time Series Models with
Some Unit Roots,” Econometrica, 58, 113–44.
Staiger, D. O., J. H. Stock, and M. W. Watson (1997): “How Precise Are Estimates of the
Natural Rate of Unemployment?” in Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc, NBER Chapters, 195–246.
Stock, J. and M. Watson (2012): “Disentangling the Channels of the 2007-2009 Recession,” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, Spring, 81–135.
Stock, J. H. and M. Yogo (2002): “Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression,” NBER
Technical Working Papers 0284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Tenreyro, S. and G. Thwaites (2016): “Pushing on a String: US Monetary Policy is Less Powerful
in Recessions,” Forthcoming, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics.
Uhlig, H. (2005): “What are the Effects of Monetary Policy on Output? Results from an Agnostic
Identification Procedure,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 381–419.
Vicondoa, A. (2016): “Monetary News, U.S. Interest Rates and Business Cycles in Emerging
Economies,” Working Paper ECO 2016/10, EUI.
32
A Appendix. Data
A.1 Events
This section describes the events that we consider to compute the monetary policy surprises.
As explained in the main text, we use two main monetary policy events.
Publication of Inflation Report. This report sets out detailed economic analysis and
inflation projections on which the Monetary Policy Committee bases its interest rate decisions,
and presents an assessment of the prospects for UK inflation. This report is published on a
quarterly basis: February, May, August, and November. Dates and times were collected from
the Bank of England database and Bloomberg.
Interest rate decisions. The Monetary Policy Committee meets every month to set the
interest rate. We use the dates and times in which the decision of the interest rate was announced.
This occurs straight after the meeting. This information was collected from the Bank of England
database and Bloomberg.
As explained in the main text, we exclude the release of the Monetary Policy Minutes since
they coincide with the publication of relevant labour market information. This fact would
introduce noise in the measurement of the surprise because the reaction of financial markets
could be due to the new flow of information about the state of the economy. Note, however,
that the main results presented in the paper are robust to adding the Monetary Policy Minutes
to the set of events.
A.2 High Frequency (Tick-by-Tick) Data
Data about financial contracts was downloaded from Thomson Reuters Tick History Database.
All transactions in future markets are recorded with their corresponding time (at the millisecond
frequency), price, and volume traded. For our analysis, we use the following contracts.
Sterling Future. These contracts are settled based on the 3-Month London Interbank Of-
fered Rate (LIBOR) and traded at the ICE LIFFE Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE).
In particular, every year there are 4 delivery months: March, June, September, and December
plus two serial consecutive months, with the nearest three delivery months being consecutive
calendar months. These contracts are traded until the third Wednesday of the delivery month
and are cancelled on the next business day.34 Similar to the Fed Fund Futures, we can extract
the expected rate from the price of each contract using the following expression:
P ht = 100− Et
[
i
(h+90)
h
]
(A.1)
where P ht denotes the current price for a contract that matures on day h and Et
[
i
(h+90)
h
]
denotes
34The following web page https://www.theice.com/products/37650330/Three-Month-Sterling-Short-Sterling-
Future contains more information about these contracts.
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the expected value of the 3-month (i.e. h+ 90 days) Libor at h.
Considering the volume traded, we use the continuous synthetic series computed by Thom-
son Reuters. In particular, we use: FSScm1, FSScm2, FSScm3, and FSScm4, which correspond
to the first, second, third, and fourth continuous contract respectively. These synthetic se-
ries are computed using the underlying contracts at each date. For example: on January 1st,
2000, FSScm1, FSScm2, FSScm3 and FSScm4 track the contracts that expire on March, June,
September, and December, respectively. Thus, at every date they capture one-year ahead ex-
pectations of the 3-month Libor. However, these continuous series are available since June 1999.
In order to complete each series from June 1997, we use the same rolling formula than Thomson
Reuters and compute the pricing of each contract using their respective underlying contract.
To check for accuracy, we compare our computed series with the ones reported by Thomson
Reuters for the period 1999-2000 and they coincide.
Forward FX between Pound and USD. This corresponds to the forward contract based on
the expected exchange rate between the Pound and the US Dollar 3 months ahead. Thus, these
contracts reflect the expected appreciation/depreciation of the Pound against the US Dollar.
Unlike the Sterling Future, this contract has a continuous of expiring dates and not just 4 times
a year. We use the series under the RIC GBP3M, which is available since January 1996 and is
very liquid.
Following Gurkaynak et al. (2005a) and Gertler and Karadi (2015), we define a monetary
policy surprise as the change in price for each contract between 20 minutes after and 10 minutes
before the event (i.e. a 30 minute window).
A.3 Macroeconomic And Financial Data
Daily Data. In our high-frequency section we use the following series:
• Gilt Yields, Forward Gilt Yields, Real Gilt Yields, Real Forward Gilt Yields: The data
comes from the estimated Government Yield Curves for different types of bonds, which are
computed at daily frequency by the Bank of England. We choose representative maturities
for the most traded contracts (i.e. with fewer missing values).35
• Expected Inflation: Implied Inflation for different maturities computed from the estimated
real Yield Curve. This series is available at daily frequency and published by the Bank of
England.
• FTSE : Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream.
• Euro, Dollar, and Yen bilateral exchange rates and Exchange Rate Index (ERI): These
series of daily nominal exchange rates are computed by the Bank of England.
35The website http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/pages/yieldcurve/default.aspx contains more infor-
mation about how the yield curve is estimated.
34
• VIX index : CBOE Volatility Index. Source: FRED Economic Data.
• Spread IG : Corporate Spread Investment Grade. This series is computed at a daily fre-
quency by the Bank of England.
• Spread HY : Corporate Spread High Yield. This series is computed at a daily frequency
by the Bank of England.
• Spread Libor 6M-Bank Rate: This variable is computed as the difference between the 6M
Libor and the Bank Rate. Source: Bank of England.
Monthly Data. In our VAR analysis we use the following macroeconomic series:
• One-Year Rate: One Year Nominal Gilt Yield. Source: Bank of England. We use the
monthly average of the daily series.
• CPI Index : UK CPI INDEX 00: All items - 2005 = 100. Source: Office for National
Statistics, U.K. We seasonally adjust this series using X13-ARIMA-SEATS program.
• Unemployment Rate: Unemployment Rate expressed in %. Source: International Financial
Statistics (IMF). We seasonally adjust this series using X13-ARIMA-SEATS program.
• Nominal Exchange Rate: Nominal Exchange Rate Index. Source: Bank of International
Settlements. This index is calculated as geometric weighted averages of bilateral exchange
rates. It is available as monthly average and an increase indicates an appreciation.
• Export and Import : Volume Indexes (2011=100) at monthly frequency. Source: Office
for National Statistics, U.K. We seasonally adjust these series using X13-ARIMA-SEATS
program.
• Corporate Spread : Investment Grade Corporate Spread Index. Source: Bank of England.
This series is available at daily frequency since January-1997. For the VAR, we compute
the monthly average of this series. Before 1997, the series was computed as the differ-
ence between the Yield on Deventures and the Bank Rate. The former is available at
monthly frequency from Three Centuries of Data dataset, which is published by the Bank
of England.
• FTSE Index : Monthly average of FTSE All-Share index. Source: Datastream.
• Commodity Price Index : All Commodity Price Index, includes both Fuel and Non-Fuel
Price Indices. Source: IMF.
• VIX index : Monthly average of the CBOE Volatility Index. Source: FRED Economic
Data.
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B Appendix. Proxy SVAR
This Appendix describes (i) the proxy SVAR methodology that we use to trace out the impact
of monetary policy surprises on the macroeconomy the and (ii) the time series properties of the
external instrument, i.e. the monetary policy surprises aggregated at monthly frequency.
B.1 Methodology
Consider the following VAR (with only one lag and no constant or trend for simplicity):
Yt = AYt−1 + ut. (B.1)
where Yt is a (m× 1) vector of endogenous variables; A is an (m×m) matrix of coefficients; ut
is a (m× 1) vector of reduced form residuals with variance-covariance matrix Σu. The objective
is to recover the structural form of the above VAR, i.e.:
Yt = AYt−1 +Bt, (B.2)
where A and B are (m ×m) matrices of coefficients; and t is an (m × 1) vector of structural
residuals with variance-covariance matrix Σε = I. Note that the reduced form residuals are a
linear combination of the structural residuals. Specifically, Bt = ut.
If we partition the vector of endogenous variables Yt as (r
′, X ′t)′ —where rt is a monetary
policy indicator and Xt is the (m − 1 × 1) vector of remaining endogenous variables— we can
re-write the reduced-form VAR as:[
rt
Xt
]
=
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
][
rt−1
Xt−1
]
+
[
B11 B12
B21 B22
][
mpt
Xt
]
, (B.3)
where A11 and B11 are scalars; A12 and B12 are (1×m−1) vectors; A21 and B21 are (m−1×1)
vectors; A22 and B22 are (m− 1×m− 1) matrices; and mpt and Xt are the structural residuals
associated to monetary policy and the remaining endogenous variables, respectively.
For the sake of argument, let’s assume that the structural matrix B is known. Then, we
would be able to compute the impulse response to a monetary policy shock. Specifically, the
contemporaneous responses of r and X to a unit shock to mpt would be given by:[
IRFr0
IRFX0
]
=
[
B11
B21
]
,
which, since the model is linear, can be normalized to:[
IRFr0
IRFX0
]
=
[
1
B21
B11
]
. (B.4)
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Finally, the impulse response functions at longer horizons can be computed as:
IRFn = An−1 · IRFn−1 for n = 2, ..., N. (B.5)
Note that if we are interested in computing the impulse responses to the monetary policy shock
only we do not need to know all the coefficients of B, but rather only the elements of the first
column of B, namely B1.
We now consider the case of B unknown. To achieve identification, we follow the external
instrument identification approach pioneered by Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and
Ravn (2013). Let ur and uX be the OLS estimates of the reduced form residuals in (B.1). Also,
let Zt be a (z × 1) vector of instrumental variables that satisfy:
E
[
mpZ ′t
]
= φ,
E[XZ ′t] = 0,
i.e., the instruments are correlated with the monetary policy shock (mp) but are orthogonal
to all the other domestic shocks (the elements of X). We can obtain consistent estimates of
B1 from the two-stage least squares regression of uX on ur using Zt as instruments. In other
words, since the reduced form residuals of the monetary policy indicator equation (urt ) are an
imperfect measure of true structural shock (mp), in the first stage we regress them on the set
of instruments (Zt):
urt = βZt + ξt, (B.6)
to construct the fitted values uˆrt . Then we regress the reduced form residuals of the domestic
equations (uXt ) on the fitted values (uˆ
r
t ) to get a consistent estimate of the ratio B21/B11:
uXt =
B21
B11
uˆrt + ζt, (B.7)
where note that uˆrt is orthogonal to ζt under the assumption that E[
XZ ′t] = 0.
Finally, we can use the OLS estimates of the matrix A to compute the impulse response
functions of all variables to a monetary policy shock using the formula in (B.5).
B.2 Instruments
Figure B.1 reports the monetary policy surprises (aggregated at monthly frequency as described
in Section 3) using different contracts, FSScm1, FSScm2, FSScm3, and FSScm4, and GBP3M.
All the monetary policy surprises display a similar behaviour. The largest surprises are con-
centrated around three events: 1998, 2002 and 2008. Also, the series display higher volatility
in the pre-crisis sample, reflecting the fact that monetary policy was constrained by the zero
lower bound in the second part of the sample period. The monetary policy surprises, however,
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display significant variation even in this part of the sample. The similarity between the different
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Figure B.1 Monetary Policy Surprises. Note. Each line represent a monetary policy
surprise computed with a different contract as explained in Section 3 in the main text.
monetary policy surprises plotted in Figure B.1 is reflected in their correlation. Among all pairs,
correlation ranges from a minimum of 0.75 (between FSScm4 and GBP3M ) to a maximum of
0.97 (between FSScm3 and FSScm4 ). The average pairwise correlation (i.e., the average corre-
lation across all pairs) is 0.89. Table B.1 reports the summary statistics for the monetary policy
surprises. All series have near-zero mean (between 0 and 0.3 basis points) and a relatively high
standard deviation (between 2 and 4 basis points); they are right skewed and display a very
high excess kurtosis; and display a small serial correlation that is either positive or negative
depending on the monetary policy surprise considered. This is a particularly undesirable fea-
Table B.1 Monetary Policy Surprises - Summary Statistics
cm1 cm2 cm3 cm4 gbp/usd
Obs 217 217 217 217 217
Mean 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.000
Max 0.361 0.405 0.336 0.250 0.235
Min -0.121 -0.127 -0.122 -0.116 -0.049
St. Dev. 0.038 0.041 0.037 0.034 0.020
Auto Corr. -0.046 -0.032 0.015 0.053 0.003
Skew. 4.359 5.174 4.189 2.911 7.575
Kurt. 44.838 50.643 37.926 23.019 87.779
Note. Summary statistics of the monetary policy surprise (computed with a different contract as
explained in Section 3. Obs is the number of observations; Mean is the sample mean; Max is the
maximum value; Min is the minimum value; St. Dev. is teh standard deviation; Auto Corr. is teh
first lag autocorrelation coefficient; Skew is skewness; Kurt is kurtosis.
ture for a series of arguably ‘exogenous’ shocks, since any persistence would suggest that the
shocks are somewhat predictable. We therefore investigate the statistical significance of those
autocorrelation coefficients.
We plot in Figure B.2 the sample autocorrelation function of the monetary policy surprise
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that we consider in our baseline estimation (FSScm2 ) together with its 95 percent confidence
bands (left panel) and its ergodic distribution (right panel). Figure B.2 shows that there is no
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Figure B.2 Monetary Policy Surprise (cm2) - Sample Autocorrelation And
Ergodic Distribution. Note. The left panel reports the sample autocorrelation func-
tion for teh monetary policy surprise compute with the second front contract (cm2),
together with 95 percent confidence bands; the right panel plots its ergodic distribution.
statistically significant serial correlation in our series of monetary policy surprises.36
Finally, we compare our series of monetary policy surprises with the one constructed by
Cloyne and Huertgen (2014). The sample period over which we can compare the two series
of monetary policy surprises goes from 1997:6 to 2007:12 — the latest available observation
in Cloyne and Huertgen (2014). The two series display quite different behaviour. Indeed the
correlation coefficient between the two is extremely low, at −0.006. As shown in Section 5, this
somewhat puzzling low correlation simply reflects the fact that our series of shocks and Cloyne
and Huertgen (2014)’s capture different information about monetary policy news.
C Appendix. Test of overidentifying restrictions
We start from the relation between the observables and unobservables in equation (16):

z1
z2
ur
uu
ucpi
 =

1/α1 −1/α1 0 0 0 0
1/α2 0 −1/α2 0 0 0
b11 0 0 1 0 0
b21 0 0 0 1 0
b31 0 0 0 0 1


mp
ξ1
ξ2
ζr
ζu
ζcpi

,
36We also checked the monetary policy surprises computed with different contracts. Only the second lag of
FSScm3 and FSScm4 is statistically significantly correlated with their contemporaneous value at the 95 percent
confidence level, while there is no statistically significant association at the 90 percent confidence level.
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Figure B.3 Instruments For Monetary Policy Shock: Narrative And High
Frequency Measures ( Overlapping Sample Period).Note. The red line displays
Cloyne and Huertgen (2014)’s instrument for monetary policy shocks (right axis). The
blue solid line displays the high-frequency instrument developed in this paper (left axis).
which can be expressed in compact form as:
x = θε.
The covariance matrix of the unobservables is given by:
Cov

mp
ξ1
ξ2
ζr
ζu
ζcpi

=

V ar(mp)
Cov(ξ1, 
mp) V ar(ξ1)
Cov(ξ2, 
mp) Cov(ξ2,ξ1) V ar(ξ2)
Cov(ζr, mp) Cov(ζr, ξ1) Cov(ζ
r, ξ2) V ar(ζ
r)
Cov(ζu, mp) Cov(ζu, ξ1) Cov(ζ
u, ξ2) Cov(ζ
u, ζr) V ar(ζu)
Cov(ζcpi, mp) Cov(ζcpi, ξ1) Cov(ζ
cpi, ξ2) Cov(ζ
cpi, ζr) Cov(ζcpi, ζu) V ar(ζcpi)

.
Note that:
Cov(ξ1, 
mp) = Cov(ξ1, z1 + ξ1) = σ
2
ξ1 ,
Cov(ζr, mp) = Cov(b12
2 + ...+ b1n
n, mp) = 0,
Cov(ζr, ξ1) = Cov(b12
2 + ...+ b1n
n, ξ1) = 0,
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where similar relations hold for other entries of the covariance of unobservables. So, we get:
Cov

mp
ξ1
ξ2
ζr
ζu
ζcpi

=

1
σ2ξ1 σ
2
ξ1
σ2ξ2 σ
2
ξ1ξ2
σ2ξ2
0 0 0 σ2ζr
0 0 0 σ2ζrζu σ
2
ζu
0 0 0 σ2
ζrζcpi
σ2
ζuζcpi
σ2
ζcpi

.
We have 14 unknowns {α1, α2, b11, b21, b31, σ2ξ1 , σ2ξ2 , σ2ξ1ξ2 , σ2ζr , σ2ζu , σ2ζcpi , σ2ζrζu , σ2ζrζcpi , σ2ζuζcpi}. The
covariance of the observables gives us 15 moments:
Cov

z1
z2
ur
uu
ucpi
 =

V ar(z1)
Cov(z1, z2) V ar(z2)
Cov(z1, u
r) Cov(z2, u
r) V ar(ur)
Cov(z1, u
u) Cov(z2, u
u) Cov(ur, uu) V ar(uu)
Cov(z1, u
cpi) Cov(z2, u
cpi) Cov(ur, ucpi) Cov(uu, ucpi) V ar(ucpi)
 .
We estimate the parameters of this system with iterative GMM, using Kostas Kyriakoulis’
gmmtbx toolbox available at https://github.com/tholden/gmmtbx.
We check that the parameters are locally identified at the optimum with the gradient matrix
of the moment vector (checking that it is non-singular). We also randomize over starting values
for the optimization procedure to ensure we have attained a global optimum. We do that by
drawing starting values from a uniform distribution between 0 and 5 with 100 replications. The
code quickly converges to a unique minimum.
D Appendix. Additional results
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Table D.1 List Of Largest Monetary Policy Surprises
Ranking Date Surprise Event Description
1 06-Nov-2008 -0.44 MPC rate decision Bank Rate reduced by 1.5% due
to “a sharp slowdown in eco-
nomic activity”
2 06-Feb-2003 -0.24 MPC rate decision Bank Rate reduced by 0.25%
due to “weaker output than ex-
pected”
3 04-Dec-2008 0.19 MPC rate decision Bank Rate reduced by 1% due to
“significant probability of under-
shooting the inflation target in
the medium term”
4 04-Feb-1999 -0.18 MPC rate decision Bank Rate reduced by 0.5% to
“provide a degree of insurance
against some of the downward
risks” from the international out-
look
5 11-Jan-2007 0.17 MPC rate decision Bank rate increased by 0.25%
due to “the world economy was
robust, nominal domestic de-
mand was growing strongly and
real output growing at least at its
potential rate”
6 08-Nov-2001 -0.17 MPC rate decision Bank rate reduced by 0.50%
due to “the prospect of domes-
tic slowdown was largely conse-
quence of the international weak-
ness”
Note. Ranking of the largest monetary policy daily surprises computed using the second front contract
of 3-month Sterling future, i.e. the 3-to-6-month ahead expectation about the 3-month Libor.
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Figure D.1 IRFs To A Monetary Policy Shock - Full Specification
With Two Instruments. Note. VAR estimated in log levels, with 2 lags,
and a constant over the 1993:1-2015:5 period. The VAR includes as exogenous
variables a Commodity Price Index and the VIX index. The 1-year Government
Gilt Yield is instrumented using the second front contract of 3-month Sterling
future combined with Cloyne and Huertgen (2014)’s monetary policy shocks
series. First stage results: F-Statistic: 18.65 and R2 = 0.07. The solid line
and shaded areas report the mean and the 90% confidence intervals computed
using wild bootstrap with 1,000 replications.
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